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DOING THE BUSINESS:
JUDGES, ACADEMICS, AND INTELLECTUALS
ALLAN C. HUTCHINSON∗
Some years ago, I ran into a former colleague and ex-Dean. He was now a judge.
After some friendly banter, he commented that he had recently read a piece that I had
published about the hoary problem of ‘state action’ in constitutional law; it argued that
the persisting doctrinal dilemmas were attributable to the contradictions of the underlying
liberal basis of rights-talk. He had reason to read it, he said, because he had to decide a
case that raised related problems about the institutional reach of Canada’s Charter of
Rights. However, after he had generously complimented me on the piece, he made a
familiar complaint – ‘For all the force of your critique, you never tell us what we should
do. Don’t you think that you should tip your hand and give us a sense of what we should
decide?’ I simply responded with my customary shrug and by saying that ‘I’m not in the
business of judging – that’s your challenge, not mine’. His implicit sense of what
academics do and should do was very different to my own.
In this short essay, I want to explain what is the ‘business’ that I think that I am in
as an academic or, more grandly, as an intellectual. In particular, I will explore and
explain what the implications of these intellectual commitments are for the fraught and
misunderstood relationship between the academic and judicial (and, by implication, the
professional) sectors of the legal community. In order to do this, I will first of all
introduce an important distinction between the two different types of intellectual role – a
traditional one and a critical one – that polarize law schools; this duality is far from
original or unfamiliar. Then, I will take the recent confirmation process of Elena Kagan
in her appointment to the United States Supreme Court to illustrate the political
characteristics and institutional context which give rise to and sustain the pervasive
acceptance by most law professors of their role as traditional intellectuals. Lastly, I will
look at how this continuing nexus between judges and law professors affects academics
in the way that they go about doing their intellectual business. Throughout the essay, I
will emphasise that ‘law is politics’ and that there is no site of political innocence or
independence that academics or judges can inhabit in meeting their professional roles and
responsibilities.

I THE INTELLECTUAL BUSINESS
While all law professors are intellectuals, they are not all intellectuals in the same
way. Legal academics are squarely within the intellectual business of producing and
trading in ideas and values about law, lawyers, and judging. That having been said, there
is little more that can be stated by way of generalization about how they go about doing
this, why they do what they do, and what interests they serve by doing it. While there is
extensive and frequent debate within law schools about the role of judges and lawyers in
society, there is no real continuing or regular debate about these more general intellectual
roles and responsibilities of law professors. Indeed, law professors seem to go about their
work as educators and scholars with little apparent anxiety about the particular
intellectual and institutional context within which these roles are formulated and
∗
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performed. Ironically, this stands in sharp contrast to the judicial community where there
is considerable soul-searching, aided and encouraged by law professors, about what
judges are supposed to be doing when they judge.
There are, of course, many different kinds of academics within law schools: they
cover a broad spectrum of approaches, motivations, and interests. However, leaving aside
those few who have become jaded and disengaged from any genuine work of a scholarly
or even professional nature, serious law professors can be effectively divided into two
main groups – the traditional and the critical. Although many law professors would resist
this bifurcation as simplistic and there are a few who straddle the divide, the great bulk of
legal academics can be easily categorized as ‘traditional’. Some might claim that many
legal academics have relinquished, if they ever upheld, the general designation as
intellectuals at all. In Twining’s familiar imagery, a large number of law professors are
content to be thought of as talented plumbers, albeit with a touch of Periclean
sophistication. 1 Indeed, there are many legal academics who wear the badge of nonintellectualism and occasionally anti-intellectualism with a certain perverse pride.
Intellectuals are those who articulate and analyse the ideas, values, and
commitments of the community, specialized or general, in which they live and function.
For legal academics, therefore, the focus is on the intellectual constructs (eg legal
doctrine, processes, institutions, personnel, etc) that constitute and energize the world of
law and lawyers. While all legal academics do this work and gain their identity from it,
they differ sharply over their approach to doing this. While traditional intellectuals are
content to work within the established paradigms and to identify with its general interests
and ambitions, the critical intellectual is less committed to the status quo and seeks to
question the benefits gained and the interests served by those established values and
ideas.2 Whereas traditional intellectuals see themselves as part of the same professional
community as lawyers and judges, critical intellectuals align themselves with a broader
and often different social context of allegiances. In short, traditional academics are
members of the legal profession first and foremost: critical academics see their
involvement with the legal community only as a necessary corollary to their more general
identity as members of the professoriate.
The fact that most law professors operate and identify as traditional intellectuals
does not mean that they commit themselves unreservedly or uncritically to the present
values and ideas of the established order. Notwithstanding the few out-and-out careerists,
they are not generally willing lackeys for the ruling elites or mindless dupes of a
manipulative system. It is not the good faith of traditional intellectuals that is in issue.
There are many legal academics that spend much of their time and effort criticizing legal
decisions, lawyerly practices, doctrinal deficiencies, and the like. However, they do so in
the name of enabling the overall legal process and personnel to fulfil better their
customary purposes and expectations; they are there in an important sense as help-mates
to lawyers and judges. Whether as critical doctrinalists or policy-wonks, they want to
advance even as they alter the basic structures of law and its liberatory potential; their
prestige and importance is tied to that of the legal process that they work to enhance.
Problems with the legal process and its personnel are more about bad apples than the
professional barrel itself.
On the other hand, critical intellectuals should not be portrayed as saintly and
uncompromised figures that are entirely immune to the seductive blandishments and cooptive lure of traditional professional prestige; they strive to place some significant
distance between themselves and the professional milieu, but they still remain within the
1
2

William Twining, ‘Pericles and The Plumber’ (1967) 83 Law Quarterly Review 396.
I am obviously drawing upon the general insights of Antonio Gramsci. See, Antonio
Gramsci, Selection From the Prison Notebooks (1971). However, I want to offer some
important modifications to Gramsci’s typology in the legal academic context. Infra, pp.**.
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professional culture. Nor should critical intellectuals be seen as always against everything
that the law claims to stands for; they are oppositionalists on behalf of some other set of
commitments, not nihilists. Furthermore, critical intellectuals are not simply those who
seek to represent the poor and oppressed under-classes. While this is an appealing
prospect, it is unrealistic. The critical intellectual is opposed to established and vested
interests which might well exclude a range of interests and ideas, some of which will not
necessarily be consistent with or benefit the goals of the social under-classes.
It is tempting to assert that critical intellectuals speak ‘truth to power’. However,
this is a problematic notion. If that means that they should be ‘a disturber of the status
quo’ and be prepared to challenge ‘ideas and values despite the restrictions of a
professional’,3 all well and good. But, if speaking truth to power is meant to suggest that
the critical intellectual must reside entirely outside the existing matrices of power, then
this is too remote and detached a standard.4 There is no place of exile that the intellectual
(or anyone else) can retire that is beyond the reach or influence of prevailing power
structures and norms. There is no available ‘outside’ from which to engage in
transformative action: all struggle for change is already sited and framed within the very
mechanisms and mediums to be resisted and re-worked. While the university is often less
infiltrated by those values than many other locations, it is not the fabled ivory tower of
much popular imagination; the university is subject to a whole host of powerful forces,
public and private, that combine to create a distinct discourse of values, ambitions and
restrictions. This is especially so of law schools as this essay tries to make clear.
Accordingly, the critical intellectual must walk a thin line between being
organically connected to and active on behalf of those people and interests which are
outside the established order and being to the side of or on the margins of traditional
institutions and contexts of power.5 This will be a shifting location as the currents and
tides of the professional establishment ebb and flow. As such, the work of critical
intellectuals is always vulnerable to being used by others to legitimize the very
professional institutions and ideas that they oppose. Because they must live in law
schools if they are to understand fully the professional culture’s wiles and ways, they
occupy a precarious ledge of existence; there are bound to be a few missteps and falls
from critical grace.
This depiction of the intellectual life of law schools will be resisted by many. In my
classification, they will see a too ready demonization of the traditional intellectual and a
holier-than-thou romanticisation of the critical intellectual. There may well be some hints
of that, but that is not my intention. However, I maintain that the basic thesis – most law
professors are traditional intellectuals – is correct. A cursory glance at much
contemporary scholarship, law school curricula, and pedagological methodology
confirms that the commitment to a very strong and relatively uniform ethos of
professional culture prevails. And this should come as no surprise. If one looks at the
typical profile of the leading law professors and their institutional connection to bench
and bar, it would be startling if this professional and traditional orientation was not the
governing ethos of legal academe. Whether by way of cause or effect, the traffic between
the bench and academe is most revealing of the mind-set of law professors as they go
about their intellectual business.

3
4
5

Edward Said, Representations of the Intellectual (1994) x and 76.
See, for example, Julien Benda, The Treason of the Intellectuals (1927).
For a further development of this idea, see, Allan Hutchinson, The Province of Jurisprudence
Democratised (2009).
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II A CONFIRMING PRACTICE
In May 2010, President Barack Obama nominated Elena Kagan for the vacancy on
the Supreme Court of the United States on the retirement of the 89-year old Justice John
Paul Stevens. After a relatively benign confirmation process, she was approved by a
Senate majority of 63-37 and took up her appointment in August 2010. She was only the
fourth woman to be appointed to the Supreme Court in its 219 year history. However, her
background and career offer a neat encapsulation of the main theme of my essay – the
close and mutually-sustaining relationship between the judicial and academic worlds and
its effect on the intellectual climate of law schools.6
The daughter of a teacher and an attorney, Elena Kagan was an excellent student.
After obtaining an undergraduate degree at Princeton and a postgraduate degree at
Oxford in history, she received her JD (magna cum laude) from Harvard Law School in
1986; she was supervisory editor of the Harvard Law Review. From there, Kagan went
on to be a law clerk for Judge Abner Mikva of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit in 1987 and then for Justice Thurgood Marshall of the U.S. Supreme
Court in 1988. After a short period in private practice as an associate at the Washington,
D.C., law firm of Williams & Connolly, she joined the faculty of the University of
Chicago Law School in 1991 and was promoted to a tenured professorship in 1995.
Almost immediately, she left Chicago to serve as an Associate White House Counsel and
later policy adviser under President Clinton. After a nomination to the United States
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit in 1999 (which expired without action), she took a
visiting appointment at Harvard Law School where she was subsequently granted tenure
in 2001. She became its first woman Dean in 2003. In early 2009, she was appointed by
President Obama (himself a Harvard Law School graduate and former Chicago Law
School professor) as the United States’ Solicitor-General.
This is a stellar career by any standards. It is difficult for anyone to gainsay her
achievements and talent. Although some commentators questioned her allegedly limited
scholarly productivity, others noted that the quality of her work was very high and more
than met any reasonable standards for academic or judicial competence. Throughout her
life and work, she earned plaudits as a pragmatic consensus-builder who was balanced
and constructive in her decisions and analysis. In both the corridors of power and the
hallways of academe, she largely managed the not inconsiderable distinction of being
able to gain the confidence and respect of both mainstreamers and more marginal figures.
At the same time, she held firm to her own liberal convictions and was no fence-sitter.
All in all, she blazed a trail that not only exceeded any reasonable expectations, but she
did so without leaving a path of used and embittered individuals behind her. This is no
mean feat in any field of contemporary endeavour.
Much of the confirmation process and public debate around her nomination was
taken up with her lack of any judicial experience. She was not, of course, the first person
without prior judicial experience. There had been about 40 of the 110 or so past Justices
who joined the Supreme Court without holding any earlier judicial post; the last was
William Rehnquist in 1972 and others include such luminaries as Earl Warren, Robert
Jackson, Joseph Story, Louis Black and John Marshall. However, it is fair to state that
this particular path to the Supreme Court is not as popular or accepted as it once was.
Perhaps more revealingly for my purposes, Kagan is also not the first career-academic to
find her way to the Supreme Court. The most well-known is Felix Frankfurter who went
straight on to the Supreme Court from his tenured chair at Harvard; Kagan spent a short
6

Professional propriety requires me to state that I know Elena Kagan; she was Dean at
Harvard when I was a visitor there. We remain on friendly terms. However, there is nothing
in this essay that speaks to her personal character or professional integrity. I have every
reason to think that she will be an exemplary justice.
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spell as Solicitor-General before her nomination. Also, present Justice Antonin Scalia
went from Chicago Law School on to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit as did present Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg who went the same route
from Rutgers and Stanford. Many others have spent part of their career in the classroom
and have added a scholarly publication to the resume.
It is the cyclical trajectory of Kagan’s career that is most revealing. She did well in
law school, clerked on the courts, went back to law school and, after periods of
government work, and went back to the court. In this regard, she represents the
archetypical model of the traditional academic and her route to judicial appointment is
not uncommon among judges. Indeed, Justice Stevens whom she replaced had himself
been a clerk to Justice Wiley Rutledge during the 1947–48 term and had been an adjunct
professor at Chicago from 1953 to 1955. Furthermore, Stevens himself had replaced
Justice William Douglas on the Supreme Court who had also been a full-time professor
at Columbia and Yale law schools. As well as Stevens, there have been four other
Supreme Court Justices who previously clerked for other Supreme Court Justices: Justice
Byron White clerked for Chief Justice Frederick M. Vinson, Justice Stephen Breyer
clerked for Justice Arthur Goldberg, Chief Justice John Roberts, Jr. clerked for Chief
Justice William H. Rehnquist, who himself had previously clerked for Justice Robert H.
Jackson. Also, Breyer had been a Harvard law professor for over 25 years before his
appointment to the Supreme Court.
Although many law professors do not get the chance to join the Supreme Court or
other judicial bodies, many of the professors at elite American schools followed exactly
the same path as Kagan from law school to a judicial clerkship and back to law school; it
remains the most common and most reliable route to elite academic appointment. As
such, Kagan’s career path evidences the very tight and mutually-reinforcing dynamic
between bench and academe. Her capacity and talent for moving almost seamlessly
between and among the different sectors of the legal profession is especially remarkable.
While her scholarly output (like that of other academic-judges, such as Breyer and
Ginsburg) was far from uncritical of the courts and judges generally, the tenor of her
writings fall squarely within the traditional genre of intellectual endeavour in that they
are broadly devoted to chastising and correcting legal doctrines, processes, and personnel
so that they better live up to and attain the professional ideals of law and judicial lawmaking. This, of course, is hardly surprising.
Of course, it does not mean that all who follow a similar path will end up at the
same destination. The great majority of the law professors who were Supreme Court law
clerks (and about 30% or so of those law clerks go on to be legal academics)7 do fall
within and often openly align themselves with a more or less traditional intellectual
orientation. Although there has been a greater extent of interdisciplinary research in
recent years and a move away from purely doctrinal exegesis, the great bulk of
contemporary scholarship remains devoted to advising courts how they might make a
better job of their allotted institutional task. Nevertheless, there are a number of former
law clerks that have taken the road less travelled; these are the exceptions that prove the
general rule. For example, Duncan Kennedy a Harvard law professor, former law clerk to
Justice Potter Stewart, and founder/leader of the Critical Legal Studies Movement, has
largely rejected the traditional paradigm and has sought to develop a consistent practice
of being a critical intellectual in his scholarship, teaching, and general professional
activities.8
7

8

See, William E. Nelson et al., ‘The Liberal Tradition of the Supreme Court Clerkship: Its
Rise, Fall, and Reincarnation?’ (2009) 62 Vanderbilt Law Review 1749; Artemus Ward and
David Weiden, Socerers’ Aprrentices: 100 Years of Law Clerks at the United States Supreme
Court (2006).
See, Duncan Kennedy, Legal Reasoning: Collected Essays of Duncan Kennedy (2008).
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This close, inter-dependent, and sustaining relationship between academics and
judges is by no means unique to the United States. While it may be more marked and
entrenched, other jurisdictions exhibit similar patterns and dynamics. In Canada, the most
common path to the professoriate still remains a graduate degree combined with an
appellate clerkship (which began in 1967). About 25-30% of academics followed this
route and, if allowance is made for the number of non-Canadian members on Canadian
law faculties, the percentage is even higher among Canadian-trained law professors.
Since the late 1970s, the overwhelming majority of Canadian Supreme Court Justices
have had at least a brief teaching career at law faculties. Indeed, some of the most renown
Canadian justices have been drawn from the ranks of academe – Chief Justice Fateux
was Dean at McGill before being appointed to the Superior Court of Quebec in 1947 and
the Supreme Court of Canada in 1949; Chief Justice Laskin was a career academic and
was appointed directly to the Ontario Court of Appeal in 1965 and to the Supreme Court
in 1970; and Justice Beetz was Dean at the University of Montreal, before being
appointed to the Quebec Court of Appeal and then to the Supreme Court in 1974. Also,
several former clerks have now gone on to become judges themselves; Louise Arbour is
a prime example of someone who was a law clerk at the Supreme Court, a career
academic, and later a justice of the Supreme Court of Canada. If one looks to the
provincial courts of appeal, the numbers of academics who have been appointed is
relatively high.9

III INTELLECTUAL POLITICS
It should be obvious from this broad accounting that the links between academics
and judges are very close. However, this in itself says little about the nature of that
relationship. In order to make my case, I need to show that there is a strong intellectual
as well as institutional connection between academe and the judiciary. And, of course,
I think that there is. Whether acting as plumbers or, more grandly, in a Periclean role,
law professors tend to position themselves and produce work in support of the legal
and especially judicial establishment; they create scholarship that strives to rationalise
and legitimise the central importance and non-ideological performance of courts.
Indeed, it is worth noting that Pericles himself was primarily a politician and military
leader. Although he is lionized for his contributions to the artistic and literary world, he
is viewed by many as tailoring those efforts to his overall imperialistic and civic
ambitions. 10 As such, insofar as he was an intellectual, he is very much of the
traditional kind.
The major intellectual effect of this close allegiance between academics and
judges is twofold – the primary focus of legal education and scholarship; and the
approach taken towards it. First, while there are no doubt other important factors in
play, the institutional interchange between judges and law professors has kept the
details and doings of adjudicative decision-making at the very intellectual heart of the
educational and scholarly agenda. Most classroom and scholarly debate centres on the
work of judges in developing the common law, interpreting statutes and exercising
constitutional review. Moreover, it is the work of appellate courts (where the clerkship
9

10

It is difficult to draw any general conclusions about Australia as clerkships are a relatively
recent phenomenon. However, about 6 out of 48 (12.5% or so) of the justices on the High
Court were once academics, including former Chief Justice Anthony Mason, former Chief
Justice Francis Brennan and present Justice Dyson Heydon. Many have held adjunct
positions.
See, for example, Victor Ehrenberg, From Solon to Socrates: Greek History and Civilization
During the 6th and 5th Centuries BC (1990).
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process is concentrated) that occupies the law students’ energies and practicing
lawyers’ mentalities. All other legal activities are given secondary attention and, when
considered, are studied in light of the judicial process. Of course, preoccupation with
courts might be warranted in its own terms, but this unlikely. Today is a legislative and
regulatory age; the great bulk of law-making and law-application is not done by courts,
but by other agencies, officers, and citizens in less formal settings. Attention to such
processes is still scant compared to that given to courts and litigation. As inculcated
and nurtured by law professors, the primary knowledge and talent of lawyers is the
capacity to slice-and-dice judicial pronouncements.
This court-centric focus is ample evidence of the intellectual consequence of the
close academic-judicial nexus. However, it is the approach that most law professors and
scholars bring to that subject-matter which is most revealing. To put it bluntly, traditional
legal intellectuals recognize that their prestige and influence are closely tied to that of the
courts. Therefore, there is a self-interested drive to show that the work of courts and, by
implication, their own work is professional as opposed to political, independent as
opposed to aligned, and balanced as opposed to partisan. Consequently, despite the
occasional (judicial) lamentation that ‘too few law professors are producing articles or
treatises that have direct utility for judges’, 11 the major ambition of most traditional
scholarship and teaching is to promote and defend the claim that judges can and should
perform their responsibilities in a politically-neutral manner.
This does not mean that traditional academics approve of everything that judges
do – far from it. However, as critical as they might be of particular judges and discrete
judgments, they are defensive of the overall judicial project; the underlying thrust of
their work is to defend the role of courts in constitutional democracies and to fashion
accounts of how judges can do that in a manner that is both determinate, just and nonideological. Although there is massive disagreement among academics about how this
best can be done, they are largely unified in their insistence that the ambition is both
appropriate and realizable. The most obvious demonstration of this tendency is in the
area of constitutional law where scholars proffer ever more imaginative and elaborate
theories – textualist, originalist, republicanist, developmentalist, structuralist, moralist,
popularist, etc – to explain how judges can and usually do fulfil their constitutional
obligations in sufficiently objective and neutral ways.12 Other areas of law are no less
rife, if less frenetically so, with similar efforts – utilitarian, Kantian, economic,
evolutionary, etc – to ground the judicial process in some neutral and fixed footings.
Notwithstanding the merits and weaknesses of any particular theory or scholarly
contribution, this entire intellectual project is as ideological as it can get. There is little
more political in scope and effect than the traditionalist claim that ‘law is not politics’,
but is somehow a mode of social activity and thinking that can lay claim to being both
technically rigorous and substantively disinterested. Yet, it is hard to imagine other
disciplines that claim a genuine intellectual legitimacy so closely connected to and part of
the activities of those of whom they stand in judgment. It would be close to ridiculous to
imagine literary scholars spending most of their time defending and acting as apologists
for the publishing trade or political theorists devoting their energies to rationalising and
shielding the machinations of the political establishment. Similarly, when law professors
not only act as a group to bolster the extant and general performance of the judicial ranks,
but do so as a matter of professional imperative, it is a conflict of intellectual interest on a
massive and largely unacknowledged scale.
11

12

Harry Edwards, ‘The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal
Profession’ (1992) 91 Michigan Law Review 34, 36.
For an excellent survey of the range and fecundity of this traditional project, see Thomas
Baker, ‘Constitutional Theory in a Nutshell’ (2004) 13 William and Mary Bill of Rights
Journal 57.
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Adjudication, especially at the highest appellate level, is not only a special social
activity that causes or conditions other social activities and planning, but it also serves the
important function of glossing its outcomes with an important veneer of naturalness and
neutrality. As official bureaucracies, the judges help to persuade citizens that the courts
are both a part of and apart from established political order and that their decisions,
therefore, should be treated as less political than those of other government actors: ‘[it] is
not so much that the court is the natural expression of popular justice, but rather that its
historical function is to ensnare it, control it and to strangle it, by re-inscribing it within
institutions which are typical of a state apparatus’.13 Consequently, participation in the
legal process as lawyer or litigant, no matter how radical the claim or cause, runs the risk
of reinforcing as it challenges the dominion of the status quo. As hackneyed as it sounds,
law professors contribute to the vital political task of designing and stitching together
those fashionable ideological outfits that outfit the judicial emperors who would
otherwise appear even more institutionally-naked. None of this is to suggest a full-blown
conspiracy between and among judges and law professors: it is simply the professional
image that academics and judges adopt through a combination of self-interest, training,
institutional allegiance, and habit.
In law schools, visiting judges are treated with a reverence that is more suitably
reserved for visiting dignitaries or religious leaders; they are held in the highest regard
and frequently placed on a ceremonial pedestal. It is simply taken for granted that, unless
the judges themselves indicate otherwise, they will be treated with kid-gloves and spared
any penetrating critique of their work; this is hardly conducive to a serious and
unflinching intellectual inquiry. In terms of the intellectual fulcrum of legal scholarship,
the overall flavour and sense of this academic-judicial imbalanced relationship is neatly
captured by Mike Taggart:
... in the common law system it is the judge rather than the scholar that has had pride of
place. The academic role has not been as glorious, central, or appreciated as the judicial
one. ... Still, the barricades between the academy and the profession ... may not be
completely gone today, but they are hardly visible. So a balanced approach to intellectual
history would look at the thought and judgments of the more reflective and influential
judges. For the most part those judgments have been the building blocks of scholars.14

This is quite the condemnation of the status and legitimacy of legal academics’
work and standing. Under this depiction, the legal academic is not only engaged in a
blatantly justificatory task, but is also very much the junior and less ‘glorious’ partner in
this scholarly enterprise. While it is understandable that judges themselves might want to
assure the public that their decisions are driven more by legal methodology than by their
personal ideology, there are no reasons why academics should be such enthusiastic
promoters of such a legitimating project. Indeed, as I have sought to explain, there are
many reasons why it might behove legal academics not to do so. Ironically, it is that
rogue-judge Richard Posner who puts it squarely when he concludes that ‘the [academic]
tendency [to defend the legitimacy of the judiciary] is paradoxically most pronounced at

13

14

Michel Foucault, ‘The History of Sexuality’ in Colin Gordon (ed), Power/Knowledge:
Selected Interviews and Other Writing 1972-1977 (1980).
Michael Taggart, ‘Prolegomenon to an Intellectual History of Administrative Law in the
Twentieth Century: The Case of John Willis and Canadian Administrative Law’ (2005) 43
Osgoode Hall Law Journal 223, 234 (footnotes omitted).
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the Supreme Court level, the paradox being that it is the most political court’.15 The
Supreme Court is not only political in the effects that its decisions have, but also in the
style, substance, and strategy of those decisions.
The transparency of this effort by most traditional academics is most obviously on
display in and around the American confirmation process. Despite the paper-thin
packaging and stylized posturing of various players, it is patently clear and almost
universally accepted that modern-day Presidents select and nominate candidates who will
hopefully uphold their own political values and thereby influence American politics long
after the appointing President leaves office. For all her undoubted ability and intellectual
competence, Elena Kagan was not selected in spite of her Democratic leanings, but
because of them; she is expected by all sides of the political spectrum, for good and bad,
to rely on her political commitments in fulfilling her judicial duties. It simply beggars
belief that law professors can somehow maintain that, once Kagan writes and delivers
judgments, she will somehow no longer be following her political convictions. Indeed,
although there is no absolute match, the available studies are unanimous that ideological
factors play an extensive role in judges’ decisions and decision-making process. While
judges may well drift over time in their ideological pre-dispositions (and, in the process,
confound the partisan wishes of their appointing President), there is little doubt that these
political commitments frame and direct the more legalistic arguments of judges.16 It is
not that judges ignore exclusively ‘legal’ arguments and methods, but that there are no
such arguments and methods available that can be utilised or relied upon in a nonpolitical way.

IV CONCLUSION
No matter how much they try to deny or finesse it, judges and law professors are all
in the politics business. And the greater vehemence with which they try to do so is only
further evidence of their political complicity. The most pressing task is most definitely
not to purge intellectual inquiry and debate of its politicalness – this is a self-defeating
and impossible endeavour. What divides the traditional and critical intellectual is not
whether they are engaged in a political enterprise, but whether they accept that they are,
to which political interests they are prepared to harness their energies, and what they are
prepared to do about it. This is not the end of genuine scholarship or intellectual inquiry
as some contend; such doom-mongering is merely a further move in the traditional law
professors’ academic game. A recognition of the inescapable political dimensions of any
intellectual pursuit is the first step in fulfilling its demands. Any alternative to the
traditional legal project must look to engage, not escape, those social forces and political
interests that combine to establish the prevailing economies of truth, power, and
professionalism. Tackling those head-on is the best way of ‘doing the business’.
My former colleague who was appointed to the courts likely deserved better than
my off-hand remark that ‘I’m not in the business of judging – that’s your challenge, not
mine’. I could have told him what to do in the facts of the case before him, but this would
not have been a legal response, but a political one. While he was looking for some
internal and coherent solution to his doctrinal and systemic dilemma, I would only be
15
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June 2010. Of course, I have offered extended arguments about what it means to say that
‘law is politics’. See, Allan Hutchinson, It’s All in the Game: A Non-Foundationalist Account
of Law and Adjudication (2000).
See, for example, Lee Epstein, Andrew D. Martin, Kevin M. Quinn & Jeffrey A. Segal,
‘Ideological Drift among Supreme Court Justices: Who, When, and How Important?’ (2007)
101 Northwestern University Law Review 1483 (2007).
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offering him my particular take on the problem in line with those political interests that I
seek to advance. I suppose that amounts to ‘business as usual’.

